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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALICIA LEDA FLYNN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 47745-2020

Bonner County Case No. CR09-18-4362

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Alicia Leda Flynn failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
sentencing her to two years, with one year determinate for possession of a controlled substance,
and retaining jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
Flynn Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
In 2018, authorities arrested Alicia Leda Flynn for domestic battery following a dispute

between Flynn and Robert Hegseth. (PSI, p. 33 (citations to electronic file named “Appeal Vol 1
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– Confidential Documents.pdf”).) At the time of her arrest, Flynn possessed a jacket and a small
backpack. (PSI, p. 33.) During a search of the backpack, authorities located a clear glass pipe
with white and burnt residue, which tested positive for methamphetamine. (PSI, p. 33.)
The state charged Flynn with one count of possession of a controlled substance, and one
count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 74-75.) While on pretrial release,
Flynn failed to appear for arraignment, and failed to comply with the terms of her release on
numerous occasions. (R., pp. 31, 61-62, 76-77, 79, 105-106, 138-139.) Flynn pleaded guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, and the state agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge. (R.,
p. 115.) The district court sentenced Flynn to two years, with one year determinate and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 154-156.) Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed
Flynn on probation for a period of two years, and credited her for 351 days served. (R., pp. 181182.) Flynn filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp. 164-165. 1)
On appeal, Flynn argues that “[t]he two-year sentence was unreasonable,” and that “[t]his
Court should discharge Ms. Flynn from probation immediately as she has already served 351 days
of incarceration and 192 days of probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Flynn has failed to show
that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing her to two years, with one year
determinate, and placing her on probation following a period of retained jurisdiction.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal
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It appears on the record that Flynn had her appeal rights reinstated through a post-conviction
action. (R., p. 162.)
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quotations and citations omitted). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution
applicable to a given case. Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902. “A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted). Rehabilitation
and public safety are dual goals of probation. State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d
461, 465 (2018). A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct.
App. 1982)).

C.

Flynn Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). The record

shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the issue
before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court reviewed the case history and stated that Flynn
“didn’t appear and so a warrant was issued. [She] bonded the same day. Then [she] failed to
appear again for the next court date, arrested on a warrant, bonded again.” (08/12/2020 Tr., p. 7,
3

Ls. 9-12.) The district court stated that Flynn “failed to comply with the release conditions and
[was] taken back into custody. This was all within a matter of just a few weeks in early 2019, in
and out of custody. [Flynn] failed to appear at [her] arraignment on February 25 and [she] failed
to comply with [her] release conditions.” (08/12/2020 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 13-18.) The district court
stated that Flynn was “arrested on March 16. [She was] released on [her] own recognizance on
April 16. Another warrant for failure to comply, [Flynn] only tested clean one time after [her]
release. [She was] back in, arrested in May of ’19 on that warrant.” (08/12/2020 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1923.) The district court noted that the state “agreed to release [Flynn] when [she] entered [her] plea
on May 24. Again, [Flynn] failed to comply with release conditions, [was] arrested eventually on
June 15. At that time [she was] charged with a new felony possession charge. That did get
dismissed without prejudice at preliminary hearing.” (08/12/2020 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 – p. 8. L. 5.)
The district court stated its “concern is that [Flynn has] been completely unable to comply, warrant
after warrant after warrant,” and that Flynn has “not shown that [she] can stay clean, [she has] not
shown that [she] can comply with the Court’s orders.” (08/12/2020 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-18.)
Flynn contends that the mitigating factors—that this is her first felony conviction, and that
the possession of methamphetamine residue in a meth pipe is a de minimus violation—show an
abuse of discretion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) Flynn’s argument does not show an abuse of
discretion.
Flynn’s LSI score is thirty, placing her in the moderate risk to reoffend category. (PSI, p.
44.) The presentence investigator noted that “a total of 16 warrants have been issued in regard to
her present and past cases. Her prior offenses include Petit Theft, Inattentive Driving, Disturbing
the Peace, False Information Provided to an Officer, and Possession of Controlled Substance.”
(PSI, p. 46.) The presentence investigator stated that Flynn “does not appear to be a good candidate
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for probation at this time,” but that “Flynn appears to be a good candidate for an order of retained
jurisdiction.” (PSI, p. 46.) During her pretrial release, Flynn failed to appear for drug tests on
February 8, 12 and 22, 2019, and June 3, 2019. (R., pp. 77, 139.) Flynn failed urinalyses on
February 15, 2019 for methamphetamine and THC, February 19, 2019 for methamphetamine, May
28, 2019 for methamphetamine and THC, and May 29, 2019 for methamphetamine. (R., pp. 77,
139.) Flynn provided an invalid urine sample on April 24, 2019, and refused to test on April 25,
2019 and June 5, 2019. (R., pp. 106, 139.)
Although the crime was Flynn’s first felony, and the amount underlying her conviction was
small, Flynn amply demonstrated her unsuitability for probation.

Flynn’s inability, or

unwillingness to comply with the conditions of her pretrial release shows that she was in need of
correctional treatment, and that she was not a suitable candidate for community supervision at that
time. The seriousness of the instant offense and Flynn’s continued drug use while released justifies
the underlying sentence of two years, with one year determinate. The underlying sentence is an
appropriate deterrence for Flynn as she is now on probation, and retained jurisdiction provided
rehabilitative structure that Flynn clearly needed at the time of sentencing. Flynn has failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing her to two years, with one year
determinate for possession of a controlled substance, and retaining jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

ZACHARI S. HALLETT
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of January, 2021, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
db@nbmlaw.com

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

6

